Project status

Accessed today — Sources: documentation published by the project, and external confirmations cited on this page. Official website: bitcoinhyper.com

Current phase

Devnet

Selective access

Mainnet window stated in the monitored documentation

Q3–Q4 2026

An indicative schedule, to be reassessed in light of audits and development

Public audits

Token audits published

SolidProof / Coinsult; no fully public audit was identified for the protocol or the bridge

SVM on devnet

Marked as operational

Per the project's statements; Rust/Anchor programs tested

Status of the key components

✓ On devnet

SVM execution layer

According to the project's documentation, SVM programs run natively on the devnet. The project states that SPL tokens, escrow mechanisms and multi-signature configurations have been tested.

◉ Under way

Sequencer (centralised)

According to the project, it is operational on the devnet. At mainnet launch it is expected to be centralised and maintained by the team.

✓ On devnet

Devnet explorer

The project maintains a public devnet explorer.

◎ In development

Canonical bridge

According to the project's documentation, the canonical bridge is under testing on the devnet. The forced-exit function is not yet implemented, and the initial custody model is federated.

◎ In development

Anchoring to Bitcoin

The documentation describes anchoring via OP_RETURN or Taproot. Adaptive frequency is still under development.

◎ In development

Data availability

The definitive solution is still under study. Among the approaches explored are external data-availability layers, erasure coding and distributed nodes.

○ Planned

Forced inclusion and forced exit

A censorship-resistance mechanism. Still under development and not available on the devnet.

◎ In development

Proving system (ZK/fraud)

The project states that it is developing a hybrid model combining fraud proofs and validity proofs. According to its documentation, this system would not be active at initial launch.

○ Planned

Security audits

Public audits have been identified for the token contract, notably by SolidProof and Coinsult. The SolidProof audit explicitly relates to a single token contract and not to the Layer 2 protocol, the bridge or other contracts. No fully public audit of the protocol or the bridge was identified in this analysis.

○ Planned

Public testnet

According to the roadmap, the project intends to open the testnet to developers and the community before mainnet.

○ Planned

Mainnet

The initial plan, as described by the project, comprises a centralised sequencer and a federated bridge. Launch depends in particular on completion of the audits and the canonical bridge.

○ Planned

Sequencer decentralisation

The roadmap envisages a period of 2–4 years after mainnet: rotation, auctions and leader election.

Timeline of key updates

July 2026 Book

Release of the English edition of Volume I of the book ‘Due Diligence of a Layer 2 – The Bitcoin Hyper Case’ by Michele Stefanelli: an independent technical analysis of the project — 523 pages and 24 chapters; the complete work comprises 36 chapters.

March 2026 Team announcement

According to a communication published by the project, the definitive data-availability solution was still under study, and several approaches had been explored.

Late 2025 Devnet

According to the project's documentation, SVM programs run natively, with an active explorer and the first tests of DeFi implementations, SPL tokens, escrow and multi-signature with selected developers.

Q2–Q4 2025 Presale and staking

The $HYPER token is offered through a public, phased presale. According to the project, staking is active, and a selective devnet is open to certain partners and developers.

Q2 2025 Foundation

Initial architecture, whitepaper v1, and formation of the core team.

Automated contract review

GoPlusLabs · May 2026

✓ Data collected

Source code verified Source code published and verified on BscScan
No proxy The contract cannot be upgraded through a proxy pattern
No mint function New tokens cannot be created after deployment
Ownership renounced Owner address: 0x000…0000 (dead address)
No hidden owner No concealed ownership-transfer function
No self-destruct The contract cannot be destroyed unilaterally
No blacklist No mechanism to block specific addresses
No whitelist No selective restriction on transfers
0% fee on buy, sell and transfer No fee is charged on transactions
Fees cannot be modified Fees cannot be raised after deployment
Anti-whale mechanism not modifiable The team cannot change the holding limit

⚠ Points requiring particular attention

Risk on external calls The contract makes external calls. GoPlusLabs flags the risk of re-entrancy or unexpected behaviour if its dependencies are updated.
Possible honeypot The automated GoPlusLabs check returned a possible-honeypot indicator during simulation. It was not possible to verify a sale independently.
Anti-whale mechanism present An anti-whale mechanism — a holding limit — is present, although it cannot be modified. This may affect liquidity in the early phase.

Editorial note

The automated GoPlusLabs checks are not a substitute for a formal audit carried out by a specialised independent firm (for example CertiK, Quantstamp or Hacken). The “possible honeypot” indicator requires manual verification: a contract may return a positive result in simulation because of conditional logic tied to liquidity or to a lock. The absence of a mint function and the renouncement of ownership are structurally positive indicators, but they do not guarantee the overall security of the protocol, which also depends on the canonical bridge, staking and governance — none of which were examined in this analysis. Moreover, this automated check must be distinguished from the token-contract audits on Ethereum published by specialised firms.

Data retrieved through the GoPlusLabs Token Security API (BSC chain 56) — May 2026. This review is updated manually; for the most recent data please consult the GoPlusLabs and BscScan services.

Points to monitor

The next key milestones, in order of importance:

  1. 1. Publication of full audits of the Layer 2 protocol and the bridge, carried out by recognised independent firms
  2. 2. Definition and documentation of the data-availability solution
  3. 3. Implementation and testing of forced inclusion and forced exit on the testnet
  4. 4. Opening of the public testnet to non-selected developers
  5. 5. Publication of the technical specifications for sequencer decentralisation
  6. 6. Publication of the GitHub repository for the core code